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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-3737 
 ___________ 
 
 FREDERICK M. TORRENCE, 




RAYMOND J. SOBINA; PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND 
PAROLE; SHELLY LEE THOMPSON; CARRIE EVERETT; DEB WOODARD 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania  
 (D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-00217) 
 Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
December 1, 2011 
 
 Before:  SCIRICA, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion Filed:  December 27, 2011) 
 _________ 
 




 In June 2010, Frederick Torrence, then incarcerated at the State Correctional 
Institution at Forest (“SCI-Forest”) in Marienville, Pennsylvania, commenced this action 
in federal court by filing a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
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The complaint, which sought money damages, named the Pennsylvania Department of 
Probation and Parole (“PDPP”) and various prison officials as defendants.  The complaint 
alleged that PDPP had unlawfully extended Torrence’s prison sentence, and that the other 
defendants had, inter alia, falsified official state documents, stolen his legal mail, and 
committed perjury to cover their acts of retaliation against him. 
 The parties ultimately consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate 
Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).  In September 2010, the defendants collectively 
moved to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, arguing that 
Torrence’s claims failed because, inter alia, he had failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies.  Although Torrence filed a response in opposition to that motion, that response 
did not challenge the defendants’ exhaustion argument. 
 The following month, the defendants filed another motion, this time seeking 
dismissal alone.  The only material difference between this new motion and the earlier 
motion was that this new motion did not raise the exhaustion issue.  The defendants filed 
this new motion to “avoid[] the necessity of converting the motion to one for summary 
judgment.”  (Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss filed on Oct. 21, 2010, at 2.)  In 
February 2011, Torrence filed a motion of his own, seeking “judgment as a matter of 
law.” 
 On September 26, 2011, the Magistrate Judge issued an order granting the 
defendants’ latter motion, denying their earlier motion as moot, and dismissing 
Torrence’s motion.  In dismissing the complaint, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the 
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claims against PDPP were barred by the Eleventh Amendment.  As for the claims against 
the individual defendants, the Magistrate Judge held that those claims were barred by the 
doctrine of claim preclusion because “[t]he present suit is based on the same cause of 
action as [Torrence’s] two previous civil rights actions, involves the same parties . . . and 
there was a previous final judgment.”1  (Mem. Op. 10.)  Torrence now seeks review of 
the Magistrate Judge’s decision. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise 
plenary review over the order at issue here.  See Gallo v. City of Phila., 161 F.3d 217, 
221 (3d Cir. 1998).  We may take summary action in this appeal “if it clearly appears that 
no substantial question is presented.”  3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 For substantially the reasons provided by the Magistrate Judge, we agree that 
Torrence’s claims against PDPP are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.  As for the 
claims against the individual defendants, we need not decide whether those claims are 
barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion, for they fail on exhaustion grounds. 
 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner must properly 
exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing § 1983 claims concerning prison 
conditions.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006).  
“[E]xhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA,” and “unexhausted claims cannot be 
                                                 
1
 In both of those earlier cases, Torrence’s cognizable claims against the prison officials 
were rejected for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.  See Torrence v. 
Thompson, No. 10-4106, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11273, at *7-10 (3d Cir. June 3, 2011) 
(per curiam); Torrence v. Thompson, 335 F. App’x 151, 153 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
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brought in court.”  Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007).  In this case, the defendants, 
in support of their motion for summary judgment, submitted a declaration from Dorina 
Varner, a Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Chief Grievance Officer assigned to 
the Grievance Review Office.  That declaration averred that, “[s]ince his arrival at SCI-
Forest, Torrence has never properly appealed any grievances to [the Secretary’s Office of 
Inmate Grievances and Appeals],” (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., at Ex. 1 para. 10), the 
office that reviews the second (and final) appeal in Pennsylvania’s prison grievance 
process, see Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 232 (3d Cir. 2004).  Torrence’s opposition to 
the defendants’ summary judgment motion did not take issue with Varner’s declaration or 
otherwise refute their argument that he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 
 In light of the above, we will summarily vacate the Magistrate Judge’s resolution 
of the defendants’ motions — we need not disturb the Magistrate Judge’s dismissal of 
Torrence’s meritless motion for judgment as a matter of law — and remand with 
instructions to enter an order (1) granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, 
and (2) denying the defendants’ subsequent motion to dismiss as moot.  Torrence’s 
“Motion for Attorney’s Fee’s [sic] and Judgment Cost” is denied.  
